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It is commonplace in the debate on Germany’s labor market problems to argue that
high unemployment and low wage dispersion are related. The hypothesis that low wage
dispersion is the reason for high unemployment is motivated by the diﬀerent trends in
unemployment and wage inequality when comparing the U.S. and continental Europe.
This notion was put into a nutshell by Krugman (1994) who argues ,,...that growing
U.S. inequality and growing European Unemployment are diﬀerent sides of the same
coin”. Accordingly, increased relative wages for the high-skilled and decreased relative
wages for the low-skilled in the U.S. are the results of (accelerated) skill-biased technical
change, (increasing) globalization or organizational changes. If continental Europe is
equally aﬀected by these trends, one would expect to observe similar changes in the
wage structure. Since this is not the case, the economic and political debate blames
institutions in Europe, such as generous social beneﬁts and strong labor unions, to
cause an inﬂexibility of the wage structure. This view, however, has not remained
unchallenged. Opponents of this view emphasize that employment trends are too
similar across countries for diﬀerent skill groups, since the former approach implies
that mainly the group of low-skilled should be aﬀected by reverse employment trends.
Making the connection between wages or the wage structure on the one hand and the
employment structure on the other hand operational for empirical testing is compli-
cated because of the considerable heterogeneity in the input factor labor. Nevertheless,
several attempts have been made to examine this relationship empirically. In general,
these studies interpret diﬀerences in unemployment rates between a small number of
(skill) groups as indicator for wage compression across these groups. Most of these
studies ﬁnd evidence for wage compression to cause the high European unemployment.
An important theoretical distinction in the literature is made between residual wage
dispersion for individuals with comparable attributes and wage dispersion between
groups with diﬀerent attributes. So far, empirical studies have focused on the relation-
ship between employment and wages regarding wage diﬀerentials between groups, thus
ignoring residual wage dispersion. Our study tries to ﬁll this research gap by analyzing
the relationship between unemployment, labor market transitions and residual wage
dispersion for the case of West Germany.
This paper is the ﬁrst attempt to discriminate empirically between the impact of two
important labor market theories for labor market dynamics, employment, and wage dis-
persion. In the conventional neoclassical point of view, which we call the heterogeneity
hypothesis, wages are determined by the marginal product of workers. Accordingly,
residual (unexplained) wage dispersion corresponds to residual (unobserved) hetero-
geneity. Taking into account the German institutional context leads us to consider the
eﬀects of union minimum wages. We argue that they result in a decline of residual
wage dispersion and higher unemployment, thereby supporting Krugman’s view. Cor-
respondingly, low wage dispersion implies high entry rates to unemployment and low
exit rates out of unemployment. A competing view, the frictional hypothesis, explainswage dispersion as the result of ﬁrms wage policies. The capacity to design indepen-
dent wage policies stems from the monopsony power that ﬁrms possess in markets that
are characterized by search frictions. An increase in the monopsony power of ﬁrms
through increasing search frictions causes both higher wage dispersion and higher un-
employment, thereby contradicting Krugman’s view. For the labor market dynamics
this implies that the job ﬁnding rates are low and that the job destruction rate is
high. The empirical analysis attempts to discriminate between the two hypotheses
for West Germany analyzing the relationship between residual wage dispersion and
both the level of unemployment as well as the transition rates between diﬀerent labor
market states. Using panel methods we allow for correlated unobserved heterogeneity
and an arbitrary structure of the covariance matrix. The ﬁndings are not completely
consistent with either theory. Taken together, however, the frictional hypothesis seems
to perform better than the heterogeneity hypothesis. Contradicting the conventional
wisdom, one robust result is that unemployment by cells is not negatively correlated
with the within–cell wage dispersion.Unemployment, Labor Market Transitions,
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References 291 Introduction
Wages and the wage formation process are crucial for understanding the labor market
and, in particular, the causes for the high unemployment in Germany. Labor demand
reacts on wages sensibly measured in eﬃciency units. Classical economic theory of-
ten concentrates on the role of human capital, may it be general or speciﬁc, where
the explanation of wages or wage growth is concerned. A big part of the empirical
literature on wages concentrates on estimating Mincer Equations, thereby estimating
returns to schooling and returns to professional experience. If individuals are indeed
paid according to their marginal productivity, which is itself determined by the human
capital endowment, then we expect that wage diﬀerentials stem only from diﬀerences
in marginal productivity. Wages, however, diﬀer between observationally equivalent
workers. We call these diﬀerences residual wage dispersion and postulate that, if the
human capital approach to wages is correct, the residual wage dispersion is explained
by unobserved productivity diﬀerences. From an empirical point of view, one can con-
trol for a part of this residual variation if allowing for eﬀects that come from speciﬁc
ﬁrms (”high wage ﬁrms”, see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)) or from speciﬁc
industries. This observation challenges the classical human capital model which as-
sumes perfect competition and which allows neither for ﬁrm-speciﬁc diﬀerences nor
for industry-speciﬁc eﬀects, except for the case that the unobserved productivity dif-
ferences are correlated with ﬁrms or speciﬁc industries.1 Even allowing for industry-
speciﬁc eﬀects, the relatively poor performance of this model in explaining the variance
of observed cross-sectional wages casts doubt on this theoretical framework. Even stud-
ies that control for a wide variety of explanatory variables beyond economic theory are
often not able to explain more than 50% of the observed variance in wages (see among
others Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003) as a recent study for Germany).
Search theory oﬀers both an interesting alternative and complement to marginal pro-
ductivity theory and human capital theory by focusing on search frictions as an expla-
nation for wage diﬀerences among workers with identical marginal productivity. The
basic idea is that under imperfect information, there is a match-speciﬁc rent because
of opportunity costs of waiting for a better match. Then, the wage is not unique and
does not necessarily correspond to the marginal product. Equally productive workers
face diﬀerent possible wages (or even a whole distribution) for which they could work.
Under this perspective, the reason why ﬁrms pay diﬀerent wages is that search frictions
lend them monopsony power, which they can exploit to diﬀerent degrees. On the one
1In the classical framework, high wage ﬁrms might have attracted high ability individuals. However,
empirical evidence even supports the contrary. Abowd, Creezy, and Kramarz (2002) and Gruetter
and Lalive (2004) ﬁnd that person and ﬁrm eﬀects are negatively correlated.
1hand, there might be high-wage ﬁrms that have to pay high wages in order to assure
their high employment. On the other hand, there might be low-wage ﬁrms that employ
only a small number of employees since they lose them at a fast rate to their better pay-
ing competitors. Wage decompositions that try to identify the eﬀect of search frictions
on the basis of search equilibrium models attribute a considerable amount of the wage
variation to search frictions.2 Search equilibrium models themselves predict a close
association between wages and labor market transitions. When implementing these
models empirically, a lot of identifying and non-testable assumptions typically have to
be imposed on the data (see e.g. Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), Van den
Berg and Ridder (1993), or Rosholm and Svarer (2004) for the implementation of a
search–matching model).
We follow a slightly diﬀerent approach here. Starting with the Krugman (1994) hy-
pothesis that the relatively small wage dispersion in Europe might be the reason for
the high unemployment in European countries, we distinguish two types of wage dis-
persion. We distinguish conceptually wage dispersion between individuals of diﬀerent
marginal productivity (”between wage dispersion”) and wage dispersion within a group
of individuals with identical marginal productivity (”within wage dispersion”) because,
from a theoretical point of view, the reasons for these might be diﬀerent. Since in the
empirical application, we are not able to control perfectly for diﬀerences in marginal
productivity, we refer to residual wage dispersion as the empirical counterpart of within
wage dispersion. Regarding between wage dispersion, there is empirical evidence for
Germany that wages are compressed across groups of diﬀerent human capital endow-
ments (as a proxy for marginal productivity) and that this compression has led to high
unemployment, especially for the group of low-skilled (see among others Fitzenberger
and Kohn (2004)). Although this view that the compressed wage structure in European
countries has led to high unemployment seems to be the conventional wisdom among
economists, it has not remained unchallenged since the trends in the employment to
population ratios across skill groups and countries are quite similar (see e.g. Krueger
and Pischke (1998) and Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999)).
Regarding within wage dispersion, the relationship with employment has rarely been
investigated. This paper attempts to ﬁll this research gap. Starting from search theory
on the one hand and from classical theory on the other hand, we discuss competing
hypotheses with respect to the relationship between labor market transitions and within
wage dispersion. On the one hand, classical theory based on marginal productivity
determining factor prices predicts that wage dispersion is determined by individual
2By search equilibrium models, we refer to a class of models based on search frictions which
explicitly model the decision problem of both sides of the labor market and which imply an endogenous
wage distribution.
2heterogeneity. So, if the within wage dispersion is small for institutional reasons (such
as union bargaining power or high levels of public assistance), we expect comparably
high unemployment rates. On the other hand, search theory predicts an opposite
relationship between the two variables. Here, a small amount of search frictions is
responsible for the low within wage dispersion. At the same time, low search frictions
lead to a low unemployment rate.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt in the literature to test between the
diﬀerent empirical implications of the two theoretical approaches.3 We use a large ad-
ministrative labor market data set for West Germany, the IAB–Besch¨ aﬁgtenstichprobe
(IABS), which covers the time period 1975 to 1997 and which contains precise informa-
tion on wages and the timing of changes in employment status. We deﬁne cells in which
individuals are homogenous with respect to age and education. Using this dataset, we
ﬁrst describe labor market transitions and wage changes following a job–to–job change,
one of the key determinants in job search models. Then, we look at the wage structure
and ask for the determinants of changes in the relative position in the wage distribu-
tion. Finally, we estimate how the rates at which labor market transitions take place
and unemployment depend on the dispersion of the wage distribution and vice versa.
Our conclusions about the inﬂuence of the transition rates on our dispersion measure
and vice versa with respect to our hypotheses are rather mixed. However, one remark-
able and stable result in favor of a frictional view of the labor market persists: we ﬁnd
that there is no negative relationship between the unemployment rate and wage dis-
persion. This result, which is surprising for Germany, contradicts the hypothesis that
labor unions might compress wages within each cell (see Krueger and Pischke (1998)),
thereby causing high unemployment.
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, we present the two competing theories,
deducing hypotheses for empirical testing. Then, we present some descriptive evidence
for transitions and the wage structure. As the main part of the empirical analysis, we
test both theories more strictly. Finally, we conclude and the appendix provides the
precise deﬁnition of variables used in the empirical analysis.
2 Theoretical Discussion
From the neoclassical point of view, wages are equal to the marginal productivity
of a person which is determined by the human capital endowment of a person after
controlling for diﬀerences in physical capital usage. In a competitive market, there
3This idea has also been used by our associated paper Fitzenberger, Garloﬀ, and Kohn (2003),
however, the scope of the analysis in that paper is much more limited compared to this paper.
3is no room for ﬁrm (size) wage diﬀerentials, nor is there room for unemployment.
Responding to the challenge of explaining these empirical regularities of labor markets,
variations of the classical approach have been developed. On the other hand, competing
theories based on search theory lead to diﬀerent conclusions. This section, discusses
both theoretical approaches and derives competing implications for empirical testing,
even though the predictions of both theories do not diﬀer in many respects.
2.1 Marginal Productivity Theory
Classical theory often assumes that markets are in a competitive equilibrium. If there
is indeed a competitive market for labor, the same eﬃciency unit of labor will be
paid the same wage, irrespectively of where it is employed. In addition, there should
exist no ﬁrm wage diﬀerentials since relatively unproductive ﬁrms will be driven out
of the market. If these assumptions are correct, human capital theory (Becker (1964))
predicts that individuals will acquire an optimal amount of human capital by choosing
the optimal amount of years of schooling. The optimal level of investment might be
diﬀerent across individuals if they have diﬀerent learning eﬃciencies.4 Furthermore,
they will acquire general and speciﬁc human capital while working.
As argued above, however, the wage seems not to be completely determined by the
human capital endowment of an individual. From the econometric point of view, there
are other factors that contribute signiﬁcantly to the explanation of an individual’s wage.
As mentioned above, we distinguish conceptually two types of wage dispersion. The
empirical counterpart of the conceptual distinction are the wage dispersion between
groups characterized by their human capital endowments (as measured by potential
experience and education) and the residual wage dispersion within a group of – with
respect to the Mincerian approach5 – equivalent individuals. If we try to explain the
wage dispersion between groups, it is determined by the human capital endowment
of this group of individuals. From this theoretical point of view, however, it seems
diﬃcult to explain wage dispersion among identical individuals. Strictly speaking,
if two individuals have the same marginal productivity they should earn exactly the
same wage and therefore, there is no within wage dispersion. The ﬁrst exception
might be related to ﬁrms employing diﬀerent capital stocks or technologies. But this
situation should not persist in competitive markets. The second exception arises if
there is speciﬁc human capital. In this case, even if we are able to measure true human
4A formal derivation of this idea in the perfect competition setting that implies diﬀerences in human
capital investments across individuals can be found e.g. in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001), p.177ﬀ.
5That is, we control for educational attainment and (potential) experience.
4capital6 endowment, the wage is not uniquely determined by the amount of human
capital but can be negotiated between the ﬁrm and the worker, since - by deﬁnition -
the speciﬁc capital is of no use in other ﬁrms (see, e.g. Franz (2003), pp. 306ﬀ., Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2001), pp. 193ﬀ.).7
Further sources of residual wage dispersion are due to measurement issues. First, we
might not be able to measure human capital correctly because of data restrictions.
Second, there might be unmeasurable qualities of individuals, like ability, that aﬀect
marginal productivity.8
When applying this theory to the German labor market, an important question is
whether this theory is able to explain the high unemployment level in Germany. At ﬁrst
sight unemployment is diﬃcult to explain in a perfect competition setting. However,
accounting for the fact that, especially in Germany, labor unions have a signiﬁcant in-
ﬂuence on the wage formation process, wages might diﬀer from their equilibrium value.
More precisely, unions in Germany bargain with employers on a schedule of minimum
wages for diﬀerent types of jobs. The so-called ”to–the–worker’s–advantage” principle
(”G¨ unstigkeitsprinzip”) allows ﬁrms to pay more but not less than the wage that is
agreed upon by unions and the employers’ association. Suppose that, indeed, labor
unions and employer associations agree upon a minimum wage. If this minimum wage
is binding in the sense that there are individuals who have gained less, there will be at
least a part of these individuals who will not be employed any more. Separate union
contracts exist for diﬀerent professional groups and diﬀerent industries. We expect
that there is in general more than one binding minimum wage for individuals with
identical observed human capital endowment since they might be employed in diﬀer-
ent industries. However, a smaller wage dispersion across individuals with identical
observed human capital endowment can, ceteris paribus, be interpreted as originating
from higher minimum wages set by labor unions.9 In the empirical part, we will apply
6We deﬁne human capital as all individual traits which inﬂuence the (marginal) productivity of an
individual.
7The residual wage dispersion can also be the result of compensating wage diﬀerentials among
observationally equivalent workers. For the purpose of this paper, they can be treated in the same
way as diﬀerences in marginal productivity.
8Measurement error is only important for the empirical concept of residual wage dispersion, since
it is not possible to control for all productivity relevant characteristics. One should always be careful,
whether one thinks of determinants of within wage dispersion for individuals that are indeed equally
productive or whether one thinks of determinants of residual wage dispersion between individuals
where some attributes have been controlled for, but where marginal productivity might still vary.
9Obviously, this raises the question why labor unions set wages too high. One possible reason is
that at least some of the low wage employees gain from the minimum wage if they are still employed
and paid a higher wage rate. In this case, we can give the behavior of the unions an Insider-Outsider
interpretation. Furthermore, there might be other reasons that explain a compressed wage structure
in a marginal productivity framework, as for example the wage rigidity literature (see e.g. Pfeiﬀer
(2003)).
5this interpretation to the connection between wage dispersion, minimum wages and
unemployment.
Empirical testing should also consider the dynamics of the labor market as reﬂected
by transition rates between diﬀerent labor market states. The classical framework is
a static one, i.e. a long-term equilibrium framework. However, since markets need
time to adapt to equilibrium values, it is realistic to assume that unemployment does
not react immediately to a change of the binding minimum wage. This is implied
by the dynamic theory of labor demand with adjustment costs (Hamermesh (1993)).
Moreover, we expect that, as a reaction to an increase of a binding minimum wage,
more labor contracts will end. That is, we observe an increasing rate of transitions
from employment to unemployment (an increasing job destruction rate) since some of
the matches which have been proﬁtable previously become unproﬁtable. If this change
is unanticipated, however, this adjustment might take time and ﬁring rates do not
increase immediately. Conversely, we observe fewer transitions from unemployment to
employment since the potential match between employee and employer will become
less proﬁtable. Here even if the change in wage dispersion is unanticipated, we expect
that the hiring rate reacts immediately, since jobs are only ﬁlled if they are proﬁtable.
Another rate that reﬂects labor market dynamics and that is of particular importance
for the subsequent search theoretic discussion is the transition rate from job–to–job. If
we allow for a slow adoption of the wage to marginal product remuneration after, say,
a technology shock, it is not clear how this relates to the wage distribution and to the
rate at which job–to–job changes take place. From this point of view, we therefore do
not have a clear prediction for the relationship between residual wage dispersion and
the rate at which job–to–job changes take place.
We summarize the empirical implications by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Heterogeneity Hypothesis): Consider a cell of observationally
equivalent workers. If the residual wage dispersion decreases, then the cell-speciﬁc
unemployment rate increases, the transition rate from unemployment to employment
declines, and the transition rate from employment to unemployment increases, possi-
bly with a lag. There is no clear relationship between job–to–job changes and wage
dispersion. Transition rates do not aﬀect future wage dispersion.
2.2 Search Framework
The discussion so far has assumed that individuals with an identical observed human
capital endowment are still heterogeneous with respect to their marginal productivity
6and that they are paid according to it. This section is based on a diﬀerent view of
the labor market. After having controlled for the educational level and for experience,
assume that indeed individuals are identical with respect to their marginal productivity
or, at least, that the employer cannot observe the diﬀerences. In addition, we drop the
assumption that the individual is perfectly informed about his/her market wage. There
is imperfect information10 for both sides of the labor market, since there are costs for
the employers to search for new employees and for the employees to ﬁnd employers. Let
these costs only consist in the opportunity cost of the time it takes to ﬁnd a match.
Then, given that an employer and an employee have come together, there is a rent
to be divided between them, since it is costly for both not to agree upon a contract
(a match-speciﬁc rent). For the employer the fallback option consists in a vacancy
that does not produce anything until the next meeting with an employee takes place
(zero proﬁt), while, as demonstrated in the seminal paper by Burdett and Mortensen
(1998), in equilibrium every match generates positive proﬁts. For the employee, the
opportunity cost consists of the diﬀerence between the wage and the reservation wage
which reﬂects his optimal decision when to accept a wage oﬀer.
Given the existence of match-speciﬁc rents, the wage for identical individuals is not
uniquely deﬁned. From economic theory, it is not clear how this rent is shared between
the parties; there is a whole range of possible mechanisms which deﬁne the rent sharing,
depending on what one assumes to be a plausible assumption. In this paper, we assume
that the wage is set by the employer, as a ”take it or leave it” oﬀer for the employee.11
In equilibrium it pays for the ex ante identical ﬁrms to choose diﬀerent strategies and
to oﬀer diﬀerent wages. The reason for this is that in equilibrium large and small ﬁrms
coexist. Large ﬁrms will pay high wages in order to attract many individuals working
at competing ﬁrms and to lose only little staﬀ to competitors. The high employment
comes at the cost of small proﬁts per employee. Firms that pay low wages, on the
contrary, will have high proﬁts per employee but only a small staﬀ, since they lose
their employees at a high rate to their better paying large competitors. This implies
that for the employee it is not clear, ex ante, at which wage rate he will initially be
employed. In addition, while being employed he moves to better paying jobs over time
since he receives oﬀers from other ﬁrms. For this setup, Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
show that the individual faces a continuous distribution of wages at which he could be
employed.
10This is most probably a reasonable assumption since most people might know more or less but
not exactly what they can earn.
11Other mechanisms are explored in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). Although this mechanism
might lead to situations where possibly proﬁtable matches do not take place, this is ”consistent with
how many labor economists view the wage setting process”(ibid., p. 2607).
7The decision of an individual searching for a job is then whether to accept a certain wage
oﬀer or to wait for the next one. To do this he compares the value of accepting the job
with the value of remaining unemployed (in the sense of expected income). If indeed,
as suggested here, the equilibrium result is wage dispersion among identical individ-
uals, the residual wage dispersion we observe in the data does not necessarily reﬂect
diﬀerences in productivity but instead it is a result of search frictions.12 But search
frictions themselves also aﬀect the equilibrium unemployment rate, thus predicting
that higher search frictions lead to higher wage dispersion and to higher (involuntary)
unemployment. Below, we will give a formal derivation of these arguments.
Consider a labor market where inﬁnitely many individuals (with measure N) are either
employed or unemployed. If employed, they produce y per time unit, which lies above
the common reservation wage. If unemployed, they obtain z as net unemployment
beneﬁt. The individuals maximize the present value of their expected life income while
discounting the future with discount rate r and without being able to choose the number
of hours worked. On the other market side, there is an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms (with
measure 1) which maximize expected proﬁts by choosing ex-ante one single wage that
they will pay to their staﬀ.13 Unemployed individuals receive independent wage oﬀers
from the stationary wage oﬀer distribution H(w) at an exogenous rate λ (job oﬀer rate),
whereas when employed they receive independent oﬀers from the same distribution at
rate λL.14 Finally, individuals working can lose their jobs for exogenous reasons at rate
δ (job destruction rate). Since we assume that the number of job oﬀers an individual
receives in a speciﬁc time interval is Poisson-distributed, there cannot be two oﬀers at
the same time. The optimal strategy for the individual is characterized by a reservation
wage wR, where all oﬀers above wR are accepted and all oﬀers below are rejected. To
calculate the reservation wage, we equate the value equations for unemployment and
employment and solve for the wage (for details, see the survey Garloﬀ (2003), equation
(7) and appendix 6.1, as well as the literature cited there). After some simpliﬁcations,
we obtain
wR = z + (λ − λL)
Z wo
wR
1 − H(w)
r + δ + λL(1 − H(w))
dw, (1)
where wo represents the maximum of the wage oﬀer distribution. Intuitively, the reser-
12The term search friction summarizes the facts that unemployed individuals cannot ﬁnd a job
immediately, that employed individuals cannot change their job immediately and that jobs can end
for exogenous reasons.
13Another possibility how the equilibrium can be achieved is that every company decides for each
new contact randomly which wage to oﬀer from the wage oﬀer distribution. However, in general it is
assumed that this violates intra ﬁrm fairness constraints. (see Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg
(2000))
14A job oﬀer means that an individual and a ﬁrm meet, that the ﬁrm makes its wage oﬀer and that
the individual decides whether to accept or not.
8vation wage is the higher, the higher unemployment beneﬁts are and the better the job
perspectives oﬀ-the-job are as compared to on-the-job. The term under the integral
represents the average surplus of the value of an employment above wR compared to
the value of unemployment. The reservation wage characterizes the behavior of the
unemployed. The behavior of employed persons is characterized by the fact that they
change jobs if they receive a job oﬀer above their current wage (see Mortensen and
Neumann (1988)).
Now, the behavior of ﬁrms has to be discussed (see Garloﬀ (2003) for details). Firms
maximize proﬁts given by the proﬁt per employee (y −w), where y denotes the output
per worker, times the number of employees (l(w)).15 In order to deduce the equilibrium
number of employees, consider the dynamics for the ﬁrms that pay wages above w.
They gain new employees from the pool of unemployed and from the pool of ﬁrms that
pay wages below w, while they lose employees only through exogenous shocks. From
these dynamics we can derive both the distribution of paid wages in a cross section
of workers (G(w)) and the equilibrium amount of workers employed in a ﬁrm paying
a wage w (l(w)). Since ﬁrms that pay higher wages are able to attract workers from
competing ﬁrms, l(w) is increasing in w.
For ﬁrms, it does not pay oﬀ to oﬀer wages below wR since workers will never accept
and so these ﬁrms will have no staﬀ. In equilibrium, ﬁrms always pay wages above wR.
To solve the model for the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution, the proﬁts of enterprises
at the reservation wage (which can be shown to be paid in any case, see Bontemps,
Robin, and Van den Berg (2000)) are set equal to the proﬁts for some other point
in the support of the wage oﬀer distribution. This yields the equilibrium wage oﬀer
distribution, which all individuals with a job oﬀer face,
H(w) =

  
  
0 for w < wR
λL+δ
λL

1 −
q
y−w
y−wR

for wR ≤ w < wo
1 for w ≥ wo

  
  
. (2)
This equilibrium exhibits the following properties: First, identical (≡ equally produc-
tive) individuals are not paid according to their marginal productivity but they face
a whole range of wages at which they can be employed. In addition, all oﬀered wages
are strictly below y if there are frictions.16 Second, the amount of frictions determines
the unemployment rate ur = δ/(δ+λ), where δ denotes the job destruction rate and λ
the job oﬀer rate for unemployed. Third, the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution does
15The price of output is normalized to 1.
16This can be seen from the upper bound of the wage oﬀer distribution, which is given by wo =
y − (y − wR)

δ
δ+λL

.
9not depend upon λ, the job arrival rate for the unemployed, since all that matters are
job–to–job changes.17
Now, assume that a labor union is able to set a minimum wage wmin cutting the wage
distribution at this point. Then, the wage oﬀer distribution is cut at that point as
well and the reservation wage in the analysis above is replaced by the union minimum
wage.18 Since the upper part of the wage distribution also depends on the reservation
wage, it follows that the whole distribution changes in response to the introduction of
the union minimum wage. In the new equilibrium, all ﬁrms still have the same proﬁts
but the level of proﬁts is lower than before, while employment remains the same.
Regarding the Krugman hypothesis, note that equilibrium unemployment does not
change in response to changes of the minimum wage as long as the latter does not
exceed the marginal productivity of the individuals aﬀected.19 In the model, this is
the case since in general ﬁrms make positive proﬁts even after the introduction of the
minimum wage and so it pays oﬀ for the ﬁrms to raise their wage oﬀer above the new
minimum wage.
The variance of the distribution of paid wages depends on two determinants: The ﬁrst
determinant and necessary condition for wage dispersion among identical workers is a
positive job oﬀer rate for employed job seekers. It is intuitively clear that the more
often individuals are able to change jobs because of wage diﬀerences, the more diﬃcult
it is for ﬁrms to pay low wages since then they quickly lose their staﬀ. This means
that the variance of wages decreases with the job oﬀer rate. With the possibility of
instantaneous job changes, the wage distribution degenerates to a mass point at the
marginal productivity, thus being back to the classical model. The second determinant
of the variance of wages is the job destruction rate. The higher this rate, the more
frequently employees lose their jobs and become unemployed. Hence, the search friction
is higher and the variance of the wage distribution is larger. This is the case, since the
trade-oﬀ for low-wage ﬁrms improves through higher inﬂows from unemployment.
In what follows, we will formalize the determinants of the variance of the distribution of
paid wages (G(w)). From equation (2) and from the equations characterizing the ﬂow
17This can be understood by recognizing that the eﬀects from higher outﬂows from unemployment
and from lower unemployment are exactly oﬀsetting in equilibrium.
18In general the reservation wage reacts as well upon the introduction or increase of the binding
minimum wage, since then wage oﬀers are higher on average. However, the increased reservation wage
remains below the minimum wage.
19Obviously, the same is true for the classical model. But, in the classical framework, if a minimum
wage is binding, there are always people whose marginal productivity is below this minimum wage,
since everybody is paid its marginal productivity. So, the crucial diﬀerence is that, under the frictional
point of view, people are not paid their marginal productivity, and therefore a binding minimum wage
does not necessarily mean higher unemployment.
10equilibria, we can calculate the variance of the distribution of paid wages for identical
individuals. It is given by (see Van den Berg and Ridder (1993), p. 48ﬀ.)
varG(w) = 1/3(y − wmin)
2η(1 − η)
2, (3)
where η = δ
δ+λL is a friction indicator often used in the search literature.20 Simple com-
parative static calculations reveal that the variance is increasing with δ and decreasing
with λL if η > 1/3. Thus, only if the job oﬀer rate on–the–job is less than twice the job
destruction rate, then the eﬀect of η on the variance is unambiguously positive. We
believe this to be a natural condition to hold, since in Germany job–to–job changes
occur less frequently than transitions from employment to nonemployment (see table 2
in our companion paper Fitzenberger and Garloﬀ (2004)). We assume that, typically,
this condition is satisﬁed in the data thus allowing us to test empirically between the
two theoretical approaches.
Again, we summarize the empirical implications in a proposition which clariﬁes the
diﬀerences to the heterogeneity hypothesis in the marginal productivity theory.
Proposition 2 (Frictional Hypothesis): If the job oﬀer rate on–the–job increases
or the job destruction rate declines, then the residual wage dispersion decreases and
the cell–speciﬁc unemployment rate declines. There is no clear relationship between
the job oﬀer rate oﬀ–the–job and wage dispersion, but unemployment decreases with
an increase in the job oﬀer rate oﬀ–the–job. Wage dispersion itself does not aﬀect
transition rates.
3 Testing the Heterogeneity Hypothesis and the
Frictional Hypothesis
We will examine whether the theoretical approaches discussed above are consistent
with data for Germany. In the following, we ﬁrst describe the dataset used. Then, we
provide some descriptive results. Finally, we scrutinize the testable predictions for the
relationship between transition rates, wage dispersion, and unemployment.
20η is the proportion of jobs that end for exogenous reasons among the sum of job destructions and
oﬀers for a job–to–job change. The higher this share, the more unfavorable is the situation for the
employees, since jobs end quite fast for exogenous reasons before the individuals can climb the wage
ladder.
113.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample (IABS), a large
administrative data set for Germany for the time period 1975 to 1997, see Bender,
Haas, and Kloose (2000). The IABS contains information from two sources. The ﬁrst
source is the employment statistic based on the integrated notiﬁcation procedure for
health insurance, social security, and unemployment insurance. This way, employers
are required to report employment under the social security system which covers about
80% of all employees. Civil servants, self-employed, helping family, students, and
employees earning less than a certain low threshold income are not covered by the
system. The second source for the IABS are the transfer payments to the unemployed.
The two sources are merged together for a one percent random sample of employees
from the social security records. Therefore, by construction, the dataset is represen-
tative regarding employment covered by the social security system but not regarding
unemployment. The information on timing (daily!) of being in one labor market state
(spells) and on the gross daily wage (rounded to DM) are exact, except for the wage
being censored at the upper social security threshold. Typical panel data problems like
panel mortality or commemoration error do not arise. In addition, the dataset is big
(about 8 millions observations) and representative for all persons who have been em-
ployed at least once in a job that is part of the compulsory notifying procedure in the
observed 22 years (more than the 80% in a cross section of workers21). In the dataset we
can observe three states: employed, recipient of transfer payments (i.e. unemployment
beneﬁts, unemployment assistance and income maintenance during participation in
training programs) and out of sample.22 Unfortunately, none of the two last categories
corresponds exactly to the economic concept of unemployment. The second state is
likely to approximate unemployment better than the third one, since every person be-
ing recipient of transfer payments is indeed unemployed from an administrative point
of view.23 On the other hand, there are persons who are registered unemployed but
who are not entitled to receive transfer payments. During this time, these people are
not recorded in the IABS. Thus, they cannot be distinguished from the self-employed,
civil servants, people being out of labor force and others (see above) who are at least
21The share is also higher for the full–time employed used in our empirical analysis.
22In addition, we could distinguish between people being out of sample between two spells of diﬀerent
states and between people who are at one point in time not in the dataset, but where there is no spell
either before or afterwards (broad deﬁnition). At the extreme, the latter might include persons who
are dead, whereas the former does not. For most analyses, we use the narrow deﬁnition of the third
state, i.e. only out of sample spells where there are spells of diﬀerent states as well afterwards as
before.
23With the exception of participants in a training program. We basically view them as being
unemployed since the goal of the program is to improve the reemployment chances in the future.
12once employed in a recorded job during the time period investigated.
We calculate transition rates between the three states. Transitions from employment
to receiving transfer payments are interpreted as transitions to unemployment,24 since
the beneﬁt entitlement period is six months, already after an employment spell of six
months, and it increases to one year after a two year spell of employment. In contrast,
transitions from unemployment into employment are not that easily approximated by
transitions from receiving transfer payments to employment. Long–term unemployed,
whose beneﬁts are exhausted, might ﬁnd a job, and there might be people shifting
from the state receiving transfer payments to the state out of sample by becoming a
civil servant or by becoming self–employed. Therefore, in the empirical section, we use
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of unemployment to check for consistency of the results.
For our empirical analysis, we use only full–time working men who are between 25
and 54 years old and who are residents in West Germany. This sample is grouped
into cells by age, education, and year. We deﬁne three education groups: The ﬁrst
category corresponds to persons who have neither a completed vocational training nor
a university degree. The second category are people who have ﬁnished a vocational
training but have no university degree. The third group corresponds to persons who
have a university degree or a degree from a technical college (”Fachhochschule”).25
We also group the individuals by their age in ten three-years-intervals (25-27, 28-30,
etc.) to proxy for potential experience. For the descriptive analysis, we use the cells
for all 22 years (1975–1997). For the explicit empirical test of the two hypotheses, we
restrict ourselves to the 17 years 1980-1997, since there are concerns that the transition
rates cannot be estimated consistently for the seventies (see Bender, Haas, and Kloose
(2000)). Annual transition rates are based on the labor market state on January 1st
of each year. The within wage dispersion is calculated for the cross section of workers
in each age–education cell for the 22 (17) years. When wages are censored from above,
we replace the censored value by the predicted value from a Tobit regression (run
separately for every age–education cell in every year) assuming that log-wages are
normally distributed in a cell.
3.2 Descriptive Evidence
24The largest group of workers not contained in the dataset are civil servants who are typically
tenured (≡ no risk of unemployment).
25Notice that the education information in the IABS-dataset is not always consistent over time so
that we corrected the education information based on the simple rule that a ﬁnished degree cannot
be lost.
13This section provides descriptive evidence on the transition rates and the wage struc-
ture. Further detailed results can be found in our companion paper Fitzenberger and
Garloﬀ (2004). First, we calculate the transition rates between the three labor market
states and the rate of job–to–job changes for each of the thirty cells by year. Several
testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between theses rates and age or educa-
tion are plausible. According to the frictional hypothesis, one might argue that the
job changing rate is higher for the better educated, since search techniques improve
with higher education. Since people sort themselves in better paying jobs as time pro-
gresses, we expect that job changing rates decrease with age. As far as the job ﬁnding
rate is concerned, one might argue that people who are older have higher reservation
wages because they had higher wages before (see e.g. Christensen (2003)). Again, with
higher education the informational situation might be better.26 According to the het-
erogeneity hypothesis, it is not clear whether job changes take place more often with a
higher education. For older workers, we expect less job changes due to a higher level
of speciﬁc human capital at risk. The same holds for the transitions to unemployment
since we suspect that their high dismissal protection (see Franz (2003), p. 251) makes
ﬁring them more unlikely. Based on the heterogeneity hypothesis, we expect the reem-
ployment probability for those who receive transfer payments to decrease in age for
institutional reasons since the length of beneﬁt entitlement increases in age.
Table 1 summarizes the transitions between the three states and their variation with
age and education using simple OLS-regressions. The reference category consists of
employees with lower education, aged 25-27. Job changes are more frequent for higher
educated individuals than for lower educated individuals and they occur less frequently
as individuals get older.27 Likewise, the probability of remaining employed is higher
for higher education groups and for older individuals. As conﬁrmed by other studies
(see e.g. Lauer (2003)), we observe the highest job stability not for university graduates
but for individuals with a vocational training degree. The probability of staying at the
same job is smaller for higher education groups but grows with age. The probability for
returning from receiving transfer payments to employment increases with the education
level and decreases with age, while likewise the probability of remaining recipient of
transfer payments increases with age and decreases with educational level. Finally,
once out of the sample, individuals return more often to employment when they hold
a vocational degree and more rarely when they ﬁnished university. It decreases with
age but seems to have a minimum at the age of 40 to 45. Finally, individuals with a
26A related argument of why the job ﬁnding rate might be higher for high-skilled individuals is given
in Moen (1999). Here the basic idea is that there might be several job applicants for one vacancy at
a time and that the person with the highest skill will always get the job.
27As a quantitative example, having a university degree as compared to having no degree at all is
associated with a 3.4% higher rate of job change.
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15vocational degree stay less often out of sample while university graduates stay more
often out of sample.28 The probability of remaining there increases with age and has
a maximum in the 40s.
We conclude that most ﬁndings discussed so far are consistent with both hypotheses
of the labor market, as put forward above, although e.g. job–to–job transitions are not
easily explained in a neoclassical framework. Since job–to–job changes are a crucial
aspect in equilibrium search theory, we explore them in more detail. We deﬁned job–
to–job changes as a change of the employer with an intervening out–of–sample spell
lasting not longer than 15 days.29
Table 2: Transitions within categories
Total Share winners Share losers No change
Full-time to full-time 282644 0.638 0.289 0.073
Part-time 1 to part-time 1 13375 0.643 0.291 0.066
Part-time 2 to part-time 2 2217 0.549 0.289 0.162
Relative gain Relative loss Overall
of the winners of the losers wage change
Full-time to full-time 0.268 -0.152 0.127
Part-time 1 to part-time 1 0.205 -0.143 0.09
Part-time 2 to part-time 2 0.268 -0.162 0.101
part-time 1: working hours are more than 50% of regular working hours
part-time 2: working hours are less than or equal to 50% of regular working hours
We consider wages before and after job change, distinguish between winners and losers
and calculate the mean gain or loss from the job–to–job change. We ﬁnd (see table
2) that in general the gains and losses from job–to–job changes are remarkable. On
average, winners earn about 25% more, while losers still earn around 15% less. Almost
two thirds have an eﬀective gain from changing jobs while more than 25% lose. In
general, the position in terms of gains and losses is better for higher educated than
for lower educated individuals. An exception is the share of winners, which is smaller
for higher education. The relative position across diﬀerent educational attainments
deteriorates with age. An exception is the share of losers, which is on average smaller
for older individuals. The high gains and the high share of winners point to the central
28Reasons might be that a university degree often is a prerequisite for becoming civil servant and
that university graduates more often become self–employed.
29We restrict our analysis to direct job–to–job changes (new job starts within 15 days after end of
old job), since we are interested in the wage eﬀects of voluntary transitions. For an analysis of wage
eﬀects of job–to–job transitions on an annual basis, see Pfeiﬀer (2003). His main ﬁndings that the
wages of job changers are more dispersed than the wages of job stayers are in accordance with our
results.
16role of the wage in understanding job–to–job changes.30 On the other hand, there is a
remarkable share of persons with losses. This result is diﬃcult to reconcile with search
theory. Still, the decreasing gains from such changes with age can be understood
by sorting processes into higher paying jobs. The fact that relative losses do not
increase with age is diﬃcult to reconcile with the notion that speciﬁc capital should be
more important at a higher age.31 As far as the relationship between education and
winner/loser shares as well as relative gains or losses are concerned, the hypotheses
discussed above do not allow to rationalize our ﬁndings.
Finally, we investigate all persons in one cell who are employed in two consecutive
years. They were classiﬁed in deciles in the wage distribution each year. So we ob-
serve a 10x10-matrix for each education-by-age cell and each year. To summarize the
information, we analyze the determinants of changing the relative position in the wage
distribution. We estimated an ordered probit model where the options were moving
one or more deciles up, remaining in the same decile or moving one or more deciles
down. Since replacing year–dummies by a linear time trend did not change our results,
table 3 only reports the latter results.
According to table 3, upward wage mobility decreases with age and increases with
education. As expected, job–to–job changers have a higher probability to move up the
wage distribution. As individuals age, upward wage mobility is considerably less likely,
even when changing jobs which also occurs more rarely. Finally, the interquantile range
(iqr) between the eighth and the second decile (in logs) exhibits a negative impact on
upward wage mobility, i.e. the higher the wage dispersion the lower is the probability
of moving up the wage ladder. Still, the ﬁndings that job changers have better career
opportunities and that older individuals perform worse are consistent with the frictional
hypothesis.
3.3 The Relationship between Transitions and Wages
After presenting some pertinent descriptive evidence, we now turn to a more rigorous
test whether residual wage dispersion is related to heterogeneity or to labor market
frictions. We start by restating the central ideas of both hypotheses. On the one hand,
if wages are basically determined by residual heterogeneity under the heterogeneity
hypothesis, we expect that low wage dispersion is a sign for high union inﬂuence, which
means that there is high unemployment and that entry rates into unemployment are
30Similarly, Fitzenberger and Spitz (2004) ﬁnd that the wage plays a central role in explaining
occupational changes.
31Of course, this argument relies on the fact that age is positively correlated with tenure.
17Table 3: Decile changes between two consecutive years
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
28-30 years -0.1492∗ (0.036)
31-33 years -0.2148∗ (0.039)
34-36 years -0.2663∗ (0.039)
37-39 years -0.3084∗ (0.039)
40-42 years -0.3877∗ (0.041)
43-45 years -0.4211∗ (0.044)
46-48 years -0.4530∗ (0.049)
49-51 years -0.4786∗ (0.057)
52-54 years -0.5242∗ (0.054)
Time 0.0040 (0.003)
Vocational training degree 0.2756∗ (0.048)
University/ technical college 0.2540∗ (0.038)
Job change dummy 0.3388∗ (0.010)
Job change x 28-30 years 0.0002 (0.027)
Job change x 31-33 years -0.0335∗ (0.016)
Job change x 34-36 years -0.0507∗ (0.011)
Job change x 37-39 years -0.0819∗ (0.014)
Job change x 40-42 years -0.1344∗ (0.012)
Job change x 43-45 years -0.1014∗ (0.019)
Job change x 46-48 years -0.1252∗ (0.015)
Job change x 49-51 years -0.1140∗ (0.015)
Job change x 52-54 years -0.1277∗ (0.02)
iqr/1000 -0.4190 (1.127)
EE/10000 -0.7428∗ (0.154)
cut1 6.8558 (5.552)
cut2 8.4212 (5.554)
N 991041
Log-likelihood -966348.106
χ2
(24) 25642.882
Signiﬁcance level: ∗ : 5%
Standard errors are robust with respect to correlations within groups (panel adjusted).
high while exit rates out of unemployment are low. On the other hand, the frictional
hypothesis postulates that wages in one cell are determined by the amount of search
frictions. If wage dispersion is low, then both search frictions and unemployment are
low as well. Either the eﬀect of search frictions can be direct via the job destruction rate
which is positively related with wage dispersion and unemployment. Or an indirect
eﬀect originates from the fact that the job oﬀer rate on–the–job (which negatively
aﬀects wage dispersion) and oﬀ–the–job (which negatively aﬀects unemployment) are
likely to be positively correlated.
18Regarding the heterogeneity hypothesis, the relevant variables can be directly mea-
sured. We will regress transition rates and the unemployment rates on our measure
of wage dispersion. For the frictional hypothesis, on the contrary, it is more diﬃcult
since the relevant variables are not observable. First, we do not observe the job oﬀer
rate on–the–job but only the job–to–job transition rate. Under the assumptions of
the search model, individuals change jobs if the wage oﬀer exceeds the current wage
(see Mortensen and Neumann (1988)), i.e. the probability of changing a job is given
by λL(1 − H(w)) where w is the wage an individual currently earns. So, if the wage
oﬀer distribution were constant, the transition rate would be proportional to the job
oﬀer rate. However, the wage oﬀer distribution varies with the job oﬀer rate. An in-
crease in the latter shifts the wage oﬀer distribution towards the marginal productivity
of the individuals, thus typically reducing the wage dispersion. We assume that the
direct eﬀect dominates i.e. an increase in the job oﬀer rate results in a higher job–
to–job transition rate. The second variable which determines the wage dispersion is
the job destruction rate. Again, it is not possible to distinguish between voluntary
quits and job destructions due to exogenous reasons.32 However, as often done in the
empirical literature, we use the entry rate into unemployment to identify exogenous
job destruction (see e.g. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998)). To check for robustness,
we use diﬀerent deﬁnitions when calculating the entry rate into unemployment.
To operationalize wage dispersion, we use the interquantile range (iqr) between the
eighth and the second decile of log wages. This is a more robust measure compared
to the sample variance (or its Tobit estimate) in a cell because of the censoring in the
wage data. For medium and low skilled worker, iqr is not aﬀected by censoring for the
vast majority of cells. However, for high skilled workers censoring is quite prevalent at
the eighth decile and, therefore, we omit high skilled worker from the analysis in this
section.33 According to the heterogeneity hypothesis, a smaller iqr reﬂects stronger
wage compression. Then, the unemployment rate, either measured by recipients of
transfer payments or by these plus individuals being out of sample, is high, while we
observe few transitions from receiving transfer payments to employment and a lot of
transitions out of employment. Based on the frictional hypothesis, we predict that
an increase in job–to–job transitions or a reduction in transitions from employment
to receiving transfer payments result in a smaller iqr. Correspondingly, the share of
recipients of transfer payments or the share of recipients of transfer payments plus
32This includes every reason which makes the previous job unproﬁtable which is beyond the in-
ﬂuence of the employer or the employee. This precludes, however, the voluntary decision to become
unemployed or the decision of the employer to lay oﬀ somebody who is enduringly unproductive. To
check for consistency in our approach we allow for diﬀerent deﬁnitions of unemployment.
33We also performed the analysis including high skilled workers (the eighth decile relies on our Tobit
estimates) which did not alter the main results. These results are available upon request.
19individuals being out of sample should decline.
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 20 education–by-age cells which are ob-
served over 17 years. Using ﬁxed–eﬀects estimation techniques, we allow for cell-speciﬁc
eﬀects in wage dispersion, transition rates, and unemployment. It is quite likely that
these cell–speciﬁc eﬀects are both correlated with the dependent variable and the re-
gressor variables, thus precluding estimating a random–eﬀects model. However, two
reasons for endogeneity are particularly noteworthy since they might not be addressed
completely by estimating a ﬁxed–eﬀects model. First, endogeneity problems arise from
the very fact that each transition from and to employment aﬀects the wage distribution
depending upon the type of selectivity of the transition with respect to the position in
the wage distribution. This is an issue when individuals in a cell are still heterogeneous
in their productivity (heterogeneity hypothesis). However, the sign of the empirical cor-
relation between changes in transition rates and the wage dispersion measure should
not diﬀer from the sign of the causal eﬀect because of the likely reaction of unions to
changes in employment prospects.34 A second reason is that the two theories postu-
late a diﬀerent direction of the causal relationship between transition rates and wage
dispersion.35 In the following, we try to address this by using lagged regressors of the
potentially endogenous explanatory variables. This means that, when estimating the
impact of transition rates on wage dispersion, we use the rates from year t − 1 to year
t to measure the impact on wage dispersion in year t and vice versa. Another reason
why the endogeneity, coming from the direct reverse causation of the theories, is not
harmful to our approach is the following. Suppose that either the heterogeneity or the
frictional hypothesis holds. Suppose further that we empirically reject, for instance, the
heterogeneity hypothesis. Then, we reject it either because it is wrong which means
that the frictional hypothesis is correct or because we have endogeneity, which also
implies that the frictional hypothesis is correct. Therefore, rejection implies both en-
dogeneity and that the heterogeneity hypothesis is wrong. On the other hand, we can
not err by accepting the heterogeneity hypothesis because endogeneity coming from
reverse causation, implies that the frictional hypothesis is correct. The latter implies a
diﬀerent direction of correlation. To illustrate this argument with an example: Assume
34Take the following example: Consider a positive productivity shock, then employment prospects
will improve and therefore transition rates into employment increase, it typically follows that wage
dispersion increases, as a ﬁrst order eﬀect, for given union contract wages. In response, unions will
raise contract wages eﬀectively reducing wage dispersion in response. If unions trade oﬀ average
wages and employment in their utility function, then both wage dispersion and transition rates into
employment (and correspondingly the employment rate) are still higher in the end compared to the
situation before the exogenous increase in transition rates. This follows from standard textbook
models of wage bargaining.
35Strictly speaking, the heterogeneity hypothesis focuses on λ and the frictional hypothesis on λL.
However, they are likely to be strongly positively correlated.
20that we regress the job destruction rate on iqr. The heterogeneity hypothesis predicts
a negative sign. Suppose that according to the frictional hypothesis the true sign is
positive. Then, it is not possible to ﬁnd a negative sign because of the endogeneity
from the frictional hypothesis, since this implies a positive correlation between iqr and
jdr and therefore the bias would go into the opposite direction.
To circumvent problems stemming from the fact that both the transition rates and the
wage dispersion measure have bounded support, we use positive monotone transfor-
mations of these variables on the left hand side that are unbounded. That is, we use
the transformation liqr = ln(iqr) for the interquantile range, and the transformation
tr = ln(rate/(1 − rate)) for the transition rates.
We estimate the model as a ﬁxed-eﬀects feasible GLS-model (FEGLS), see Wooldridge
(2002, chapter 10.5.5).36 Consider the following model estimated to test the hetero-
geneity hypothesis:
trit = α + iqritβ + ci + uit (4)
for cells i = 1,...,20 and year t = 1980,....,1996. iqrit is the interquantile range, trit
is the transformation ln(rateit/(1 − rateit)), with rateit being the transition rate from
t−1 to t, α the intercept, ci the unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed constant
over time, and uit represents the unsystematic error component. In addition, equation
(4) includes year dummies to control for business cycle eﬀects.37 Estimation proceeds
in two steps. First, we estimate equation (4) by ﬁxed eﬀects. We then calculate the
empirical covariance matrix of the ﬁxed eﬀects residuals. After omitting one equation,
since the covariance matrix of the ﬁxed-eﬀect-residuals does not have full rank (see
Wooldridge (2002), chapter 10.5.5), the remaining covariance matrix is used for the
GLS transformation. Second, we estimate the transformed model. Table 4 comprises
the result of the second stage.38
36We started with implementing both the standard ﬁxed–eﬀects estimator and the estimator in ﬁrst
diﬀerences. Typically, both variants seemed ineﬃcient since the associated error terms after the ﬁxed–
eﬀects and the ﬁrst–diﬀerences transformation, respectively, still showed considerably autocorrelation
and the precision of the estimates was quite low. The results for ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrst diﬀerences are
available upon request.
37See Wilke (2004) for the importance of business cycle eﬀects on transition rates in Germany.
38Note that estimating equation (4) as a system of equations would not result in an eﬃciency gain,
since we use the same regressors in all equations. (see Wooldridge (2002), chapter 7.3)
21Table 4: FEGLS-regressions of the (transformed) transi-
tion rates on the lagged interquantile range (Heterogene-
ity hypothesis)
Dependent variable Coeﬃcient Standard Expected
estimate β error sign
jdr1 (E-BR) 0.0259 0.1198 -
jdr2 (E-BR|OOS) -0.0595 0.0683 -
jdr3 (E-NoE) -0.1265∗ 0.0478 -
jfr1 (BR-E) -1.7274∗ 0.2782 +
jfr2 (BR|OOS-E) -0.8449∗ 0.2159 +
jcr (E-EO) 0.2516∗ 0.0400 0
∗indicates that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant on the 5% signiﬁcance
level. See appendix for the deﬁnition of the variables. The re-
sults for the year dummies have been suppressed from the table for
readability. The estimation is based on 340 observations. Further
explanations are given in the text.
The signs for diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the job destruction rate (jdr1-jdr3) conﬁrm in
two out of three cases the heterogeneity hypothesis. It is signiﬁcant, however, only
for the broadest deﬁnition of entries into unemployment. From this it is not clear,
whether an increasing wage dispersion indeed reduces transitions from employment to
unemployment, as predicted by the heterogeneity hypothesis. The estimated coeﬃ-
cients for both deﬁnitions of the job ﬁnding rate (jfr1, jfr2) are signiﬁcantly negative
and contradict therefore the heterogeneity hypothesis. We expected that a higher wage
dispersion would imply that unemployed ﬁnd jobs faster, since there are more jobs that
ﬁt the marginal productivity of the searching individuals. This seems not to be the
case in Germany. The wage dispersion was not expected to have any eﬀects on the job
changing rate (jcr). The data, however, contradict this view as well. The higher the
wage dispersion the higher is the job changing rate. Finally, we also explore directly
the relationship between unemployment and wage dispersion, which is the focus of the
heterogeneity hypothesis. For the narrow deﬁnition of unemployment (recipients of
transfer payments only) u, we ﬁnd a positive sign, but it is not signiﬁcant. Including
the state out of sample (variable ˜ u) increases slightly the size of the eﬀect, it remains
however insigniﬁcant. For both deﬁnitions the sign contradicts the heterogeneity hy-
pothesis since higher wage dispersion is associated with higher nonemployment or at
least with no employment change. In the light of our previous ﬁndings, this implies that
the negative eﬀect of the wage dispersion on the job ﬁnding rate dominates other eﬀects
that drive (equilibrium) unemployment and that may counteract this link. Thus, the
heterogeneity hypothesis seems not to perform very well if confronted with the data
and, in particular, it is in contradiction to the lack of a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient
22for unemployment. Though not being signiﬁcant, the positive coeﬃcient estimates are
consistent with the frictional hypothesis.
Table 5: FEGLS-regression of (diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the transformed) unemployment
rates on the (lagged) interquantile range (Heterogeneity hypothesis)
Dependent variable Coeﬃcient estimate Expected
(Standard error) sign
u 0.0629 -
(0.0796)
˜ u 0.0658 -
(0.0804)
The Estimation is based on 320 observations. See appendix for the
deﬁnition of variables. Further explanations are given in the text.
Next considering the frictional hypothesis directly, we investigate whether the transi-
tion rates aﬀect the (logarithm of the) interquantile range in the expected direction.
Our estimated model is speciﬁed as
liqrit = α + ratei,t−1β + ci + uit , (5)
where i = 1,...,20, and t = 1980,....,1996. Again, year dummies are included to
control for business cycle eﬀects. The model is estimated by FEGLS. Table 6 contains
the results for estimating equation (5) regressing the transformed interquantile range
on the transition rates.
23Table 6: FEGLS-regressions of the (logarithm of the)
interquantile range on the lagged transition rates from
period (t-1) to t (Frictional hypothesis)
Coeﬀ. estimate jdr1 jdr2 jdr3 jcr jfr1 jfr2
(Stand. error) (E-BR) (E-BR|OOS) (E-NoE) (E-EO) (BR-E) (BR|OOS-E)
0.9106∗
(0.1099)
0.7693∗
(0.0907)
0.6094∗
(0.0887)
liqr -0.0351
(0.1557)
0.1143∗
(0.0214)
0.1946∗
(0.0252)
0.9099∗ -0.1806
(0.1100) (0.1420)
0.9140∗ -0.2849∗ 0.1199∗
(0.1042) (0.1257) (0.0181)
Exp. sign + + + - 0 0
See appendix for the deﬁnition of the variables. The estimation is
based on 320 observations.
The frictional hypothesis purports that the job destruction rate (jdr1-jdr3) should
have a positive inﬂuence on wage dispersion. This is supported by the data since we
ﬁnd positive signs which are always signiﬁcant. Obviously, a higher job destruction
rate is associated with higher wage dispersion, from the point of view of the frictional
hypothesis because higher job destruction increases the monopsony power of the ﬁrms
via its eﬀect on unemployment. The second prediction concerns the job changing rate
(jcr). Here, an increase in the job–to–job transition rate should reduce wage dispersion.
The signs found in the data are well in accordance with this hypothesis. However, we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect only when controlling for transitions from employment
to unemployment and for transitions from unemployment to employment. Obviously,
if people change jobs more often wage dispersion decreases or remains unchanged.
Finally, we suspected that the job ﬁnding rate (jfr1, jfr2) bears no inﬂuence on wage
dispersion. This implication is not conﬁrmed. Instead, we ﬁnd a positive inﬂuence
of the job ﬁnding rate on wage dispersion which always proves signiﬁcant. When
individuals ﬁnd jobs faster, this seems to increase wage dispersion.
As a second evaluation of the frictional hypothesis, we regress the (logarithm of the)
24wage dispersion measure on the lagged unemployment rate and on the lagged frictions
indicator η = δ
δ+λL (using the job–to–job transition rate for λL) again under inclusion
of year dummies as regressors and using either the narrow or the broad deﬁnition of
unemployment. The results in table 7 indicate that η does not show the expected
direction of inﬂuence. The frictional hypothesis predicts that wage dispersion rises
with a higher amount of market frictions η. Empirically, however, a higher value for
η seems to be associated with lower wage dispersion. This must be interpreted as
evidence against search theory. Especially, in light of the previous estimation results
this is astonishing, since we ﬁnd that both factors inﬂuencing η, that is, δ and λL show
the correct sign from the point of view of the frictional hypothesis. The results for the
two deﬁnitions of unemployment are in favor of search theory. Overall, one should be
cautious not to overinterpret these results, in particular, since our empirical measure
for λL is not exactly the job oﬀer rate on–the–job.
Table 7: FEGLS-regressions of the log of the interquantile range on the lagged frictions
indicator and the lagged unemployment rate (Frictional hypothesis)
Coeﬃcient estimate η ˜ η u ˜ u
(Standard error)
iqr -0.0012 -0.5367∗ 0.1943 0.3842∗
(0.0171) ( 0.1608) (0.1099) (0.1116)
Expected sign + + + +
The Estimation is based on 320 observations. Year dummies are in-
cluded as regressors. See appendix for the deﬁnition of the variables.
Summing up, we conclude that both the heterogeneity hypothesis and the frictional
hypothesis are only partly consistent with the data. In a strict sense, both hypotheses
are rejected by the data. Taken together, the frictional hypothesis seems to perform
better than the heterogeneity hypothesis. Regarding the starting point of our discus-
sion, namely the relationship between wage dispersion and unemployment, our results
favor search theory and contradict the Krugman hypothesis regarding residual wage
dispersion.
4 Conclusions
This paper attempts to discriminate between diﬀerent theories on the relationship be-
tween unemployment and residual wage dispersion. Starting from the Krugman (1994)
hypothesis, we develop two hypotheses which exhibit diﬀerent empirical implications.
One view, which we denote heterogeneity hypothesis, is that wages are determined en-
tirely by marginal productivity so that residual wage dispersion corresponds to residual
25productivity dispersion. To account for the institutional setting in Germany we allow
labor unions to compress wages from below by imposing diﬀerent minimum wages for
diﬀerent types of worker. Diﬀerences in residual wage dispersion might stem from
union inﬂuence diﬀering in strength. Accordingly, unemployment results because the
minimum wage is higher than the marginal productivity of the unemployed. The alter-
native view, which we denote frictional hypothesis, is based on search theory. It states
that after having controlled for age and education, residual individual heterogeneity
is not suﬃciently strong to account for the considerable residual wage dispersion. In-
stead, the residual wage dispersion is determined by the amount of search frictions. If
search frictions are high, we will observe a high wage dispersion since search frictions
lead to monopsony power for the ﬁrms resulting in higher wage dispersion. Accord-
ingly, unemployment is not caused by minimum wages set by labor unions but is a
result of the search frictions. Our empirical analysis tests these opposing hypotheses.
We obtain panel estimates that are based on the comovement in transition rates, un-
employment, and wage dispersion within age–education cells. The results are slightly
more supportive for the frictional hypothesis than for the heterogeneity hypothesis.
Especially, regarding the relationship between unemployment and residual wage dis-
persion, the frictional hypothesis seems to perform better. Thus, regarding residual
wage dispersion, our results contradict the Krugman hypothesis. A compression of
the residual wage dispersion does not have to be associated with an increase in un-
employment. Future research should address the challenging issue of estimating the
relationship between employment and both between– and within–wage dispersion in a
uniﬁed framework.
There are a number of critical issues which should be mentioned at the end to put
this study into perspective. First, the two hypotheses are complementary in a broad
sense. They become mutually exclusive in the sense that the frictional hypothesis
postulates ’observable’ residual heterogeneity while the heterogeneity hypothesis does
not, once productivity related heterogeneity is accounted for. Second, the data do
not perfectly match the data requirements. For instance, it would be interesting to
investigate whether our (imperfect) wage dispersion measure is correlated with the
relative strength of the union membership in a cell. Third, at this level of analysis,
we cannot use the primitive variables, which search theory is built upon, e.g. the job
oﬀer rate while employed instead of the actual rate of job changes. In this sense, our
analysis operate at a descriptive level. However, this has the advantage that it does
not require the strong assumptions typically invoked to estimate structural models of
search equilibrium.
26Appendix: Deﬁnition of Variables used in Empirical
Analysis
1. jdr refers to the job destruction rate and has three diﬀerent versions:
jdr1 (E–BR) is the rate of persons that are employed (E) in one year and who
receive beneﬁts (BR) in the next year.
jdr2 (E–BR|OOS) is the rate of individuals who are employed in the ﬁrst year
and receive beneﬁts or are out of sample (OOS, conditional on returning) in the
following year.
jdr3 (E–NoE) includes in the second year also individuals that do not return to
the labor market.
2. jfr refers to the job ﬁnding rate and has two diﬀerent versions:
jfr1 (BR–E) is the rate of individuals that receive beneﬁts in one year and who
are employed in the next year.
jfr2 (BR|OOS–E) comprises both beneﬁt recipients and individuals that are
temporarily not in the dataset (i.e. conditional on returning) in the ﬁrst year.
3. jcr (E–EO) is the share of individuals that has changed jobs between two consecutive
years.
4. When rates are used as left hand side variable in regressions, they are transformed
as follows
tr = log(rate/(1 − rate))
to insure that the variable is unbounded.
5. The wage dispersion measure iqr is the diﬀerence between the log of the eighth decile
and the second decile. For the purpose of the regression, on the left hand side, we take
the log of the diﬀerence, i.e.
liqr = log(iqr),
to ensure that the variable is unbounded.
276. The unemployment rate u in the narrow deﬁnition is deﬁned as
u =
BR
E + BR + OOS
,
and, in the broad deﬁnition, ˜ u is given by
˜ u =
BR + OOS
E + BR + OOS
.
As a left hand side variable, we use the transformation u = log(u/(1 − u)).
7. The narrow frictions indicator is calculated as
η =
jdr1
jdr1 + jcr
,
while the broad deﬁnition is given by
˜ η =
jdr3
jdr3 + jcr
.
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